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Abstract
Online video piracy (OVP) is a contentious topic, with strong
proponents on both sides of the argument. Recently, a num-
ber of illegal websites, called streaming cyberlockers, have
begun to dominate OVP. These websites specialise in dis-
tributing pirated content, underpinned by third party indexing
services offering easy-to-access directories of content. This
paper performs the first exploration of this new ecosystem. It
characterises the content, as well the streaming cyberlockers’
individual attributes. We find a remarkably centralised system
with just a few networks, countries and cyberlockers under-
pinning most provisioning. We also investigate the actions of
copyright enforcers. We find they tend to target small subsets
of the ecosystem, although they appear quite successful. 84%
of copyright notices see content removed.
1 Introduction
Online Video Piracy (OVP) has been the focus of an increas-
ing debate over the past years. Entire political movements
have emerged around the idea that content should be freely
available (Miaoran 2009), whilst lobbyists consistently ar-
gue that dire consequences exist. For example, CBP re-
ported that piracy costs the US economy over 750,000 jobs,
and between $200-250B per year (Raustiala and Sprigman
2012). Regardless of one’s stance, it is undeniable that OVP
constitutes a major web traffic generator (Monitor 2011;
Elder 2016), and creates significant interest from users, law
enforcers and the creative industries alike.
Traditionally, online piracy was dominated by decen-
tralised peer-to-peer (P2P) systems such as Gnutella and
BitTorrent. However, these have since been surpassed by
a new breed of more centralised service allowing users to
stream pirated content directly from YouTube-like websites
— so called streaming cyberlockers. These streaming cy-
berlockers have gained huge traction. For example, many
prominent portals are in the Alexa Top 1K, e.g. openload.co,
thevideo.me and vidzi.tv. Their ease of use attracts a large
number of users and the difficulties law enforcers encounter
when detecting user identities provides viewers with relative
safety from prosecution. Organisations such as the Motion
Picture Association of America (MPAA) have, therefore,
shifted their efforts towards shutting down the cyberlockers
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themselves. Examples of prominent shutdowns witnessed
in this paper include allmyvideos.net, vidbull.com and vod-
locker.com.
Although similar to typical social video platforms, these
streaming cyberlockers address a very different need. They
employ few, if any, copyright checks and utilise evasion tac-
tics to avoid detection. For example, they often curate con-
tent on their front-pages to appear legitimate and disable
search to prevent visitors from looking up videos. This has
created an interesting ecosystem where cyberlockers depend
on third party (crowd-sourced) indexing websites that create
a searchable directory of direct links (URLs) to the videos.
These two types of website operate hand-in-hand with a
symbiotic relationship, collectively underpinning a global
network of online piracy.
To date, little is known about this emerging ecosystem.
Its exploration, however, could reveal a range of insights re-
garding how large-scale copyright infringement takes place.
This raises several particularly interesting questions, includ-
ing: what type of copyright content is shared? What are
the dynamics regarding both content and website appear-
ance/disappearance? What web hosting characteristics are
commonly seen and how resilient are they? How are these
websites pursued by copyright enforcers and how do the
websites react?
To answer these questions we exploit several measure-
ment methodologies (§3), acquiring evidence of the charac-
teristics exhibited in this domain. As it would be impossi-
ble to inspect the entire copyright infringement ecosystem,
we have taken a slice of 3 prominent indexing sites, as well
as 33 different cyberlockers. Between January and Septem-
ber 2017 we performed monthly crawls, collecting all pub-
lished videos on these indexing sites. In parallel, we have
scraped their related cyberlockers, collecting data on each
video, including its availability and where it is hosted. To
complement this data we further gathered metadata on the
videos themselves, e.g. release date and genre. Finally, we
have monitored legal take down notices, allowing us to un-
derstand the reaction of the cyberlockers to complaints.
We begin our analysis by exploring the streaming links
shared on indexing sites (§4). We find a set of web platforms
actively involved in aggressive copyright infringement. Pre-
dominantly content is made up of recently released Drama,
Comedy, Thriller, and Action films. However, we also ob-
serve a non-negligible amount of older content — some
videos are from over 100 years ago. The websites we mon-
itor show clear temporal trends with periods of activity, fol-
lowed by collapse — likely driven by legal take downs. For
example, putlocker.is (an indexing site) ceased uploading
new links three months into our measurements. This reveals
a model rather more vulnerable than the decentralised P2P
networks.
We then inspect the characteristics of the individual cy-
berlockers (§5). We model these concepts as several graphs
that capture the related attributes of websites. A key finding
is the apparent centralisation of these portals, with a small
set of dependencies vulnerable to attack from copyright en-
forcers. For example, we observe that 58% of all videos
are located within just two hosting providers (despite be-
ing spread across 15 cyberlockers). Similarly, we find strong
signs that individual pirates tend to operate multiple web-
sites. For instance, although seemingly different cyberlock-
ers, daclips, gorillavid and movpod are all operated by the
same owner. These three cyberlockers alone host 15% of ob-
served content. Again, this suggests a distribution model that
is far less resilient than its decentralised P2P counterparts.
Finally, we inspect the behaviour of copyright enforcers
(§6). By studying the takedown notices placed against the
cyberlockers under observation, we find that most enforcers
take a bulk approach — selecting a set of cyberlockers and
generating many notices. That said, most cyberlockers do
appear to placate such enforcers. During our measurement
period, 84% of notices later saw the content removed. Our
results have implications for understanding modern copy-
right infringement both from the perspectives of content pi-
rates and law enforcers (§7).
2 Background & Related Work
Before beginning our analysis, we provide a brief overview
of the the general area, as well as related works.
2.1 Overview of Video Piracy Stakeholders
There are three major stakeholders worth considering. The
failure of any of them would result in the collapse of the
ecosystem. The players are:
Video Uploader: A video uploader harvests video content
(e.g. using BitTorrent) and uploads it to a streaming cyber-
locker. For each video uploaded, a unique URL is received.
These URLs are published by the uploader on an indexing
site with the appropriate metadata for searching.
Streaming Cyberlocker: A streaming cyberlocker is a web
platform where a video uploader stores content. Typically a
streaming site is neither searchable nor indexed by search
engines. Users require the specific URL to view the content.
Indexing Site: Indexing sites operate as a public directory,
mapping video metadata (e.g. title) to a list of cyberlocker
URLs where the content can be viewed. They allow viewers
to search for any desired video and select a preferred stream-
ing site.
2.2 Related Work
Online video distribution is not a new topic. The stream-
ing cyberlockers work on a model of third parties uploading
content. There are a range of video platforms allowing users
to upload and share their own content, e.g. YouTube (Zink et
al. 2008; Torres et al. 2011; Cha et al. 2007) and Vimeo (Sas-
try 2012). Ding et al. characterised YouTube uploader be-
haviour and classified the uploads (Ding et al. 2011). It was
discovered that the majority of content was copied and lit-
tle actually user generated. Of most relevance to our work
is the use of such platforms to distribute copyrighted ma-
terial. There have been several studies looking at how plat-
forms have been exploited for such purposes (Clay 2011;
Hilderbrand 2007). In response, platforms like YouTube
now employ signature-based detection to prevent copy-
righted material remaining online (Dutta and Patel 2008).
This has led to a range of unusual evasion techniques, e.g.
removing portions of the film and injecting artefacts.
This complexity has resulted in pirated content moving
away from these portals towards what are known as cyber-
lockers or one click file hosts (OCFH). These services offer
remote storage, allowing users to share files. (Mahanti et al.
2012) provide an understanding of the nature of OCFHs and
their effect on the network. Sanjua`s-Cuxar et al. also anal-
ysed HTTP traffic emanating from OCFHs, ranking them
amongst the major contributors of HTTP traffic on the In-
ternet (Sanjua`s-Cuxart, Barlet-Ros, and Sole´-Pareta 2012).
Perhaps closest to our own work is (Lauinger et al. 2013b;
2013a; Farahbakhsh et al. 2013). The first works scraped
data from several OCFHs, such as MegaUpload and Rapid-
Share, to understand the fraction of files that infringe copy-
right, whilst the second work investigated the impact of the
MegaUpload shutdown on BitTorrent. Although closely re-
lated, our focus is not on file sharing but on pirated video
streaming. We know of only one work targeting streaming
services (Rafique et al. 2016). This work investigated the
security implications of illegal sports streaming, as well as
how deceptive adverts and malware are used for moneti-
sation. These sports sites are quite different to the movie
sites we observe, primarily because they are live broadcasts.
Hence, we proceed to study the broader aspects of video
piracy. Our paper sheds light on the behaviour of these web-
sites in reaction to legal action, as well as the individual char-
acteristics and relationships between them. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first paper focusing on the streaming
cyberlocker ecosystem.
3 Methodology & Data Collection
We begin by presenting our measurement methodology. Our
measurements follow three steps: (i) Collecting all stream-
ing links from the indexing sites; (ii) Visiting the links to
check the availability of the videos; and (iii) Gathering ex-
tended metadata for each video and website under study.
3.1 Indexing Sites
Due to the sheer number of indexing websites, it is impos-
sible to evaluate them all. Hence the first step is to select a
subset of indexing sites — these operate as “seeds” which
Indexing Site No. ofindexed videos
No. of videos
with streaming links
No. of
streaming links
% of videos
with streaming links
No. of unique
cyberlockers
putlocker.is 25,700 24,974 148,878 97.2 104
watchseries.gs 49,614 49,522 300,296 99.8 125
vodly.cr 64,021 55,313 346,524 86.4 84
Total 139,335 129,809 795,698 93.2 151
Table 1: Summary of data collected from each indexing site.
allow us to identify key cyberlockers. To achieve this, we
inspected court orders obtained by the MPAA to understand
those sites viewed as important by copyright enforcers. We
then complemented this by performing a variety of searches
on Google using relevant terms (e.g. “free films”, “watch
movies free”). This was intended to discover websites that a
typical user may encounter when searching for free content.
This is confirmed by industrial reports that highlight many
of the cyberlockers we observe as key offenders (NetNames
2014). From these two data sources, we identified three reg-
ularly occurring websites: putlocker.is, watchseries.gs and
vodly.cr (Orlowski 2013). These three sites mainly index
streaming links to movies, with an additional small fraction
of TV shows. In this paper, we use the term video to refer
to both. We emphasise that these may not be representative
of all indexing sites — our analysis is specific to these three
large sites, although we note these are significant players in
the broader ecosystem.
We have designed a crawler that iterates over all video
pages indexed on each of the three indexing sites. It extracts
the video title, release year, genre and all associated stream-
ing links. As previously stated, the indexing sites do not host
any content — only links to external cyberlockers. We initi-
ated this crawl on 12/01/2017 and repeated it on a monthly
basis until 12/09/20171. Table 1 summarises the data for
each indexing site targeted.
3.2 Streaming Cyberlockers
After each monthly snapshot was gathered from the three
indexing sites, the crawler followed each streaming URL to
gain data from the cyberlockers themselves. We identified
a total of 151 streaming cyberlockers on the indexing web-
sites. We identify individual cyberlockers using their domain
name; note that this includes mirrored cyberlockers with dif-
ferent Top Level Domains (TLDs). Unless stated otherwise,
we treat these as different portals. The cyberlockers had di-
verse setups, and many had taken steps that made crawling
challenging. For example, six domains used Dean Edward’s
compression algorithm2 for obfuscating the server hosting
the content. As it was impossible to scrape all 151 cyber-
lockers,3 we selected the 33 most prominent streaming do-
1putlocker.is was crawled for monthly period starting
12/01/2017, 12/02/2017, 12/03/2017 as it went offline after-
wards. In the case of vodly.cr, we crawl it from 12/04/2017
onwards
2http://dean.edwards.name/weblog/2007/08/
js-compression/
3Partly due to the frequency by which these websites change
their web interface
mains; this set covered 59.3% of extracted streaming links.
The selected domains were those which were currently on-
line and made the video information available to collect. The
domains that were not selected were either offline at the time
of scraping or redirected to a different site. Unlike YouTube,
we found that the user interfaces were quite primitive, lack-
ing reliable metadata e.g. view count and date of upload. For
instance, 64% of examined streaming cyberlockers did not
allow searching and 42% of portals “curated” their front-
pages with legal short videos, which appear to have fake
view counters. Therefore, for each video, we only recorded
whether or not the video was online and the domain of the
server it was hosted on.
3.3 Cyberlocker Metadata
Once we had collected all cyberlockers, we compiled meta-
data for each one. For every cyberlocker domain we per-
formed DNS propagation checks around the world to gener-
ate domain → IP address mappings. We discovered a total
of 1,903 distinct IP addresses hosting videos. We mapped
each IP address into its geographical locations using Max-
mind GeoLiteCity4 and Autonomous System (AS) using
Team Cymru.5 We discovered servers distributed across
8 countries, 2 continents and 9 distinct Autonomous Systems
(ASes). Following this, we loaded all cyberlocker home-
pages using phantomjs.6 Upon each load, we recorded all
the first and third party domains loaded by the page.
3.4 Lumen Database
A major theme in our work is understanding the role that
video portals play in copyright infringement. It is, therefore,
necessary to obtain ground truth data on which videos com-
promise copyright. To gather such data, we have scraped the
Lumen database between 01/01/2017 and 30/09/2017 (the
same period as our cyberlocker crawls). Lumen is a platform
that aggregates legal complaints and requests for removal of
online content. Each record covers an individual complaint
to one or more organisations. An entry contains the URL(s),
the complainant, the date and the complaint target (i.e., a cy-
berlocker). Lumen predominantly captures complaints made
to Google for removing content links from search results.
Beyond this, Lumen also contains complaints to other search
and social media sites, e.g. Bing and Twitter.
4https://www.maxmind.com/
5http://whois.cymru.com
6http://phantomjs.org/
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Figure 1: Number of streaming links per category.
4 Characterising Indexing Portals
When a user wishes to view a video, the first entity they must
interact with is an indexing site. In this section, we review
what links are made available on these indexing portals, as
well as the cyberlockers and content they point to.
4.1 How Many Links Are Available?
We begin by inspecting the number of content items being
indexed over time. This can be measured from two perspec-
tives: (i) the number of video pages made available (there is
one page per video) and (ii) the number of streaming links
made available on those pages. The former represents the
number of new videos added to the indexing portals, whilst
the latter captures the number of links per video. To give a
brief understanding of the types of videos available, Figure 1
shows the number of links within the top 20 genres specified
on the indexing sites (this also coincides with IMDB’s7 top
20 genres). It can be seen that Drama, Comedy, Thriller, Ac-
tion and Horror videos dominate; the distribution in each in-
dexing site is roughly equal and all follow an identical rank-
ing.
When combining all genres we discover a total of 139,335
video pages and 795,698 streaming links. Figure 2 plots the
number of streaming links attached to each video for each
indexing site (across each release year). On average a video
has 6 streaming links, but there is clear relationship between
the recency of the release and the number of streaming links
available. About 73% of links are for videos released since
2000. Diversity can also be observed across the different
portals: this figure is 81% for putlocker.is, 74% for vodly.cr
and 69% for watchseries.gs. This indicates that the portals
offer different styles of corpora. Overall, the average num-
ber of streaming links for videos with recent release years
(≥2000) is 7, compared to just 4 for earlier releases.
We also observe that 7% of video pages list no streaming
links; this suggests that either the links were removed, or
the pages were generated without links being added. This is
particularly prevalent for older videos. About 11% of videos
with release years before 1980 do not have any streaming
links, compared to just 6% for later release years. Only
7http://www.imdb.com/
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Figure 3: Cumulative Distribution Function (CDF) showing
the distribution of streaming domains based on their Alexa
Rank.
0.3% of videos in 2017 have no links. This is likely driven
by the higher demand and the more proactive participation
of people uploading fresh content. That said, these portals
also contain extremely old content, some over 100 years
old. Characterising these portals as exclusive copyright-
infringement platforms may therefore be misplaced. Curi-
ously, the fraction of films released before 1950 without
streaming links is actually lower than later films — just 6%.
We assume this is because such videos are not aggressively
pursued by copyright enforcers, hence reducing the number
of legal actions.
4.2 Which Cyberlockers Are Most Popular?
The previous section inspected the number of streaming
links. Next, we investigate which cyberlockers are most
prominent. From the 795,698 streaming links extracted,
there are 151 unique streaming cyberlocker domains. We
first inspect their popularity as measured by the Alexa Rank-
ings. Figure 3 presents a Cumulative Distribution Func-
tion (CDF) of the Alexa ranks for the cyberlockers. About
60% of these streaming domains are in Alexa’s Top 1M.
Amongst these, 70% are in the Top 200K. The top three
most popular streaming sites are openload.co (rank 147),
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Figure 4: Breakdown of streaming links seen on each indexing site per month. We began crawling indexing site vodly.cr in
April when putlocker.is was taken offline. The stacked bar is ordered with the largest cyberlocker at the bottom.
thevideo.me (543) and vidzi.tv (745). These rankings, how-
ever, do not correlate well with the number of videos hosted
on the domain (Spearman coefficient of -0.015). For exam-
ple, streamin.to hosts 30,401 videos compared to just 7,288
for vidlox.tv and 1,924 for streamango.com. Despite this,
the latter two rank 5,699 and 2,124 compared to just 6,625
for streamin.to. We can also inspect popularity through the
lens of the indexing sites. Figure 4 presents a breakdown
of the streaming links that make up the indexing sites, split
by monthly snapshot. This is primarily intended to visualise
the breakdown of cyberlockers per month, rather than their
evolution over time. Note that the indexing sites vary across
the time periods because putlocker.is ceased uploading new
content in April, to be replaced by vodly.cr.
Firstly, it can be seen that well known user-generated con-
tent platforms such as YouTube, Vimeo or Dailymotion are
not observed once. Instead, the indexing portals exclusively
link to videos hosted on platforms that operate outside of
the “mainstream”, e.g. thevideos.tv, movpod.net and vide-
oweed.es. Secondly, it can be seen that the cyberlockers
present on each indexing site are different. This suggests
communities where individual cyberlockers are associated
with particular indexing sites. 30% of cyberlockers are ex-
clusive to a single index; 33% are seen on two; the remainder
appear on all indexing sites. The latter are, unsurprisingly,
those with the greatest number of links. From the cyberlock-
ers found on multiple indexing sites, 73% of their links are
unique and seen once. In other words, only 27% of cyber-
locker links are posted on more than one of our indexing
sites. This suggests that different pirates have quite different
strategies for promoting links to their content.
The prominence of each of these cyberlockers also
changes across the monthly snapshots. For example, in
February, we witness the introduction of vidlox.tv and
streamplay.to; in March — streamflv.com; in April — speed-
vid.net; in July — watchers.to and in August — strea-
mango.com. We also observe removals of cyberlockers, e.g.
in April, thevideos.tv ceases to be indexed. This is because,
prior to this, it was exclusively indexed by putlocker.is. Upon
ceasing operation in April, the loss of putlocker.is meant that
thevideos.tv disappeared from our vantage point.
We also see arrival and removal dynamics within individ-
ual links to each of the cyberlockers. Out of the 33 streaming
cyberlockers we examined, we observed that 25 had links
both added and removed. The remaining 8 had only addi-
tional links injected, and never had any removed: these were
openload.co, vidtodo.com, vidup.me, estream.to, stream-
play.to, vidlox.tv, streamango.com, watchers.to. In total 55%
of cyberlockers saw growth during our measurement pe-
riod, whilst 45% saw a decline. The most extreme was di-
vxstage.to ,which in June had 24% of its links removed from
the indexing sites. In contrast, in July streamplay.to saw a
107% increase in the number of links indexed. These ag-
gressive dynamics are presumably enabled by the ease that
uploaders can move between cyberlockers.
5 Characterising Cyberlockers
The above has revealed a wide range of cyberlockers. We
next explore the characteristics of these cyberlockers, specif-
ically regarding (i) the use of third party domains within the
webpages; (ii) the hosting of their video content; and (iii) the
similarities between the webpage HTML structure. Whereas
the first two aspects shed light on the design and build of the
websites, the third provides insight into potential relation-
ships that may exist between the websites.
5.1 Modelling Cyberlockers
To model the relationships between cyberlockers, we em-
bed them into a series of graph structures. Each graph cap-
tures shared characteristics and potential relationships be-
tween the websites. We use several techniques to generate
three graphs from our data:
• Domains = (V,D,E1), where V is the set of cyberlock-
ers, D are third party domains, and E1 link third party
domains to the cyberlockers where they are embedded (in
the homepage). As we are interested in identifying rela-
tionships, we filter domains with a degree of one.
• Networks = (V,N,E2), where N consists of Au-
tonomous Systems (ASes), and E2 is a set of directed
links indicating that a cyberlocker is hosted within a given
AS. This allows us to reason over the hosting strategies of
these operators.
• HTML = (V,E3), where E3 contains weighted links
based on the homepage HTML similarity between two
cyberlockers ∈ V . Similarity is computed using the tag-
based algorithm described in (Cruz et al. 1998). For each
pair of cyberlockers, we obtain a weight t ∈ [0, 100].
A weight of 100 indicates identical HTML structures; a
value of 0 indicates entirely disjoint HTML structures.
The rationale for this is to reveal if there are some individ-
uals who control multiple cyberlockers by simply reusing
the same or similar website templates.
Once the graphs are generated, we use the Louvain algo-
rithm (Blondel et al. 2008) to perform graph clustering. This
is intended to identify communities based on shared charac-
teristics in Domains, Networks and HTML. In the case
of HTML, this explicitly highlights cyberlockers that were
likely generated by the same operator.
5.2 Understanding Cyberlockers
By exploring these three graphs an understanding of indi-
vidual cyberlocker characteristics can be gathered, as well
as providing insite into why and where these features are
shared. Figures 5(a)(b)(c) present the graphs of Domains,
Networks and HTML; the nodes within these graph are
coloured to indicate the individual communities detected us-
ing the Louvain algorithm.
Shared Third-PartyDomains Firstly, we look at the third
party domains embedded within the cyberlockers. These in-
clude various domains ranging from ad networks to ana-
lytic services. In Figure 5(a) we identified 87 third-party do-
mains (nodes) forming 4 communities. The globally most
central nodes are three advertisement/tracking platforms —
google.com (betweenness of 1,580), rtmark.net (536) and
deloton.com (376). Structurally these create a fully con-
nected graph with most cyberlockers embedding these do-
mains (or being a maximum distance of 2). Employing the
Ghostery database8 we were able to classify 60% of ex-
tracted domains. Of these classified domains, 50% was clas-
sified as First Party Exceptions, 44% as Advertising and the
rest split evenly between Patterns, Site Analytics and Social-
Media.
As the predominant form of monetisation, we next ex-
plore the domains classified as advertising. Within these do-
mains, popular ad networks include PopAds (in-degree 14),
PubMatic (10) and DoubleClick (9). Note that PopAds spe-
cialises in “popunder” advertising (Le and Nguyen 2014) —
something banned by Google’s AdSense. Generally though,
these major ad networks forbid publishers with illegal con-
tent and, therefore, their terms of service are clearly being
broken (which risks account removal). The large number
(23) of advertisement brokers used by these cyberlockers
suggests that these policies are not strictly enforced. If these
ad domains were to cease offering adverts to the cyberlock-
ers the operators would likely be significantly affected. With
this in mind, we see several alternative monetisation tools
beginning to emerge. More than a third of the cyberlock-
ers have started using the recently released Coinhive plu-
gin which mines cypto-currencies on the viewer’s machine.
Furthermore, we observe the presence of various malicious
domains e.g. codeonclick.com (4 cyberlockers), rfihub.com
(3), and nexac.com (3), which download adware onto the
viewer’s machine, as well as mathtag.com (2), exelator.com
(2) and btrll.com (2), which perform browser hijacking. The
dependency that cyberlockers have on these revenue sources
suggests their removal would pose a severe risk to their
operation, unlike most prior P2P platforms which are self-
sustaining.
Co-located Network Hosting Following on, we look at
the Autonomous Systems (ASes) used to host video content.
This is again modelled as a graph with links indicating the
hosting of a particular cyberlocker within a given AS. This is
important for several reasons. Most notably, the Digital Mil-
lennium Copyright Act (DMCA) allows legal parties to ap-
proach ASes who may have control over web content within
their networks. These networks, therefore, represent a poten-
tial point of failure for the cyberlockers. In Figure 5(b), we
see a total of 7 communities formed around such providers.
Firstly, we see three isolated communities: thev-
ideobee.com (hosted on HISTATE), veoh.com (VEOH-AS)
and watchers.to (PLI-AS). These jointly contribute only
3.4% of the streaming links from our selected set of cy-
berlockers. Thus, the impact of removing these websites (or
ASes) would be limited. The remaining four communities
are larger and inter-connected via a series of bridge nodes.
Bridge nodes are, by definition, those websites that spread
their content across multiple ASes. These are openload.co,
vidlox.tv, streamin.to, estream.to, vidzi.to, and vidto.me).9
8https://www.ghostery.com/
9Shutting down these streaming cyberlockers would remove
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Figure 5: (a) Third-party domains linked by streaming cyberlocker homepages. (b) Autonomous Systems where video servers
are hosted. (c) HTML similarity between cyberlocker homepages. Within each sub-figure, each colour indicates a community
formed when the Louvain method for community detection is applied. Note - some hosting ASes used by some sites are not
present within (b) as these cyberlockers have not injected live videos during our crawl. In (b) and (c), the size of a node is
proportional to its degree, while the thickness of an edge in (c) indicates the closeness in similarity
Within the four inter-connected communities, M247 and Co-
gent have the highest degree centrality, with a degree of 7
and 8 respectively (i.e.,they host 7 and 8 cyberlockers each).
Shutting down these two ASes would result in 58% of the
videos, and 71% of the servers observed in our set becoming
unavailable. This indicates a remarkable level of vulnerabil-
ity and clearly a point of failure that could be leveraged by
copyright enforcers.
We posit that the 6 cyberlockers hosting content across
multiple ASes may do so to increase resilience against take-
downs (§6.2). Furthermore, to bolster this redundancy, there
is a clear trend in the physical locations of the servers.
M247 is based in Romania, which (as a country) hosts the
largest share of streaming servers, containing 42% of the to-
tal streaming links witnessed. Similarly Cogent/Leaseweb
are based in The Netherlands which hosts 23% of streaming
links. This trend is reportedly driven by the lax copyright en-
forcement within these countries combined with their high
capacity Internet infrastructure (Henderson 2013). A sudden
increase in copyright regulation within these countries may
see a shift in this behaviour and, again, we argue that this
dependency on individual countries poses a resilience chal-
lenge for the cyberlockers.
HTML structure of cyberlocker homepage Lastly, we
compare the HTML of the cyberlocker homepages to de-
tect underlying similarities between sites. This is because
we hypothesise that some individuals may create multiple
cyberlocker front-ends (e.g. to increase resilience). If this is
true, it could imply that large segments of the cyberlocker
system, which appear independent on the surface, are ac-
tually orchestrated by the same individual or organisation.
To compute this, we use an existing pattern matching algo-
rithm (Ratcliff and Metzener 1988), which gives each pair
33% of all videos.
of websites a similarity score, t ∈ [0, 100]. To add context,
we executed the algorithm on the Alexa Top 100 websites:
the median similarity score was just 2.5. We then built a
weighted graph with links between websites weighted by
their similarity.
The resulting weighted similarity graph is presented in
Figure 5(c). The thickness of an edge indicates the similar-
ity score. However, unlike the previous bipartite graphs, the
communities present show a direct (rather than transitive) re-
lationship between cyberlockers. Within the graph two main
communities can be identified, the Green group and the Yel-
low group. The median similarity scores in these two groups
are 77.9 and 53.6 respectively. The Pink group contains the
remaining very loosely connected cyberlockers with a me-
dian similarity of just 18.3. Manual inspection suggests that
any scores above 30 indicate strong similarity.
It should also be noted that these similarities are also mir-
rored across Domains and Networks. For example, the
Green group all host within the Cogent AS. We further ob-
serve that 4 out of 6 sites (gorillavid.com, gorillavid.in, mov-
pod.net and movpod.in) fall into the same community within
Domains. These inferences are confirmed by WHOIS,10
which reveals that gorillavid, movpod, daclips are all regis-
tered with the same owner. Unfortunately, 48% of our cyber-
lockers use WHOIS anonymisers to avoid registering their
details. This prevents us from definitively proving shared
ownership in other case. However, we briefly note that usage
of anonymisers may itself indicate a similar owner. For in-
stance, 0% of the sites in the Green group utilise anonymis-
ers, in contrast to 73% in the Pink group.
It is also important to understand why these similari-
ties emerge. In some cases, the similarities are driven by
websites using similar templates. For example, daclips, go-
10A protocol for querying the registered owner of an Internet
resource.
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Figure 6: Number of video streaming URLs submitted as
infringing belonging to streaming domains (Jan-Sep 2017).
rillavid and movpod use the same structural template, but
with different colour coding and other minor differences.
The opposite extreme also exists — novamov.com operates
as an front for auroravid.to; all visits to novamov.com redi-
rect to auroravid.to. From the 28 node pairs identified as
having a similarity scores above 75%, we find that 8 are
identical pages and 8 have shared templates; the remaining
12 node pairs could be considered to share templates, but
one or both of the nodes redirects to another page. From
the identical pages, 3 are mirrored TLDs (e.g. .com and
.in), whereas the remainder have totally different domains
but pointing into a shared page. Overall, these observations
mean that at least one fifth of our cyberlocker domains
are actually operated by just two organisations/individuals,
again confirming a remarkable dependency on just a small
number of stakeholders.
6 Exploring Take down Dynamics
Finally, we briefly turn to our Lumen dataset to understand
the level of copyright infringement taking place and the re-
actions of the websites to take down notices.
6.1 Overview of Complaints
In total we find 780M infringing URLs from our crawl of the
Lumen database. This covers copyright complaints lodged
from 01/01/17 to 30/09/17 and lists websites ranging from
cyberlockers to Torrent sites. This list was, therefore, filtered
to only include the 33 streaming domains observed in our
crawl. This left 21.8M infringing URLs across 49,829 indi-
vidual complaints from 304 organisations.
Figure 6 presents the number of complaints against each
of the cyberlockers under-study. It can be seen that go-
rillavid.in has the most complaints by far, followed by da-
clips.in and movpod.in (note, these three were identified as
existing in the same community in both the Networks and
HTML graphs). These sites account for 48% of the total
complaints made against our selected cyberlockers. Despite
this, they do not constitute a major contributor to videos
within our dataset (just 1.2%, 0.3% and 0.3% respectively).
We see more contributions from their mirrored websites un-
der different Top Level Domains (TLDs): movpod.net, da-
streaming cyberlockers
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Figure 7: Percentage distribution of infringing URLs lodged
by reporting organisations against each cyberlocker
clips.com and gorillavid.com (4.7%, 4.5% and 3.8%). These
mirrored sites received far fewer complaints, despite pos-
sessing more links. When combined, the top 3 most popular
sites (openload.co, thevideo.me and vidzi.tv) receive 24% of
all complaints.
This leads onto the question of who generates these com-
plaints? We identify a total of 304 notice senders — Table 2
shows the top 10. Unsurprisingly, these are dominated by
content producers such as 21st Century Fox and Walt Dis-
ney. We also find a number of dedicated anti-piracy com-
panies (e.g. Mark Monitor, Rivendell, Vobile). These top
10 notice senders contribute 96% of all URLs complained
about within the list examined, with the remaining 294 cov-
ering just 4%. Upon closer inspection, trends can be ob-
served among these top complainants. Figure 7 presents a
heat map; the Y-axis list the top 10 complainants, the X-
axis lists the cyberlockers. The heat represents the fraction
of notices from each complainant to each cyberlocker. It can
be seen that most complainants are highly selective in terms
of which cyberlockers they complain about. For example,
about 98%, 89% and 73% of URLs complained about by
Skywalker Digital, Remove Your Media and MG Premium
Limited were aimed at openload.co. Why such organisa-
tions choose to target individual cyberlockers in this way
is unclear. However, the trend generalises across other com-
plainants too. For instance, we see daclips.in, gorillavid.in
and movpod.in being jointly targeted by Fox Group (63%),
Mark Monitor (38%), Redacted (55%) and Vobile (86%).
Despite this, we find no evidence that these cyberlockers
contain more or less content belonging to each complainant.
6.2 How Do Cyberlockers React?
The above shows that complaints are regularly made against
these portals. Next we inspect the reaction of cyberlockers
to such complaints. Note, Lumen does not record specific
complaints made to the cyberlockers, they record complaints
made about them (to other parties e.g. Google, Bing). Util-
ising the monthly snapshots, we can see if videos uploaded
in 2017 were removed after a complaint had been lodged.
Thus, we extract the set of complaints that correspond to
videos in our dataset. This leaves a total of 2,669 streaming
Notice
sender
No. of
URL
No. of
notice
No. of
domains
fox group legal 8,508,289 1,876 22
markmonitor antipiracy 5,777,393 5,795 24
rivendell 3,369,745 9,842 26
vobile inc 3,214,057 12,044 28
redacted 400,329 228 28
remove your media llc 291,213 488 21
nbcuniversal 236,969 345 29
walt disney company 168,139 1,472 25
mg premium ltd. 97,176 1,063 26
skywalker digital ltd. 89,046 649 22
Table 2: Top 10 copyright infringing notice senders
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Figure 8: Cyberlocker URLs reported for infringing copy-
right compared to URLs deleted. X-axis ranked by fraction
of takedown requests acted upon.
links reported in 2017, associated with 275 videos released
during this period. This, of course, leaves a large number of
complaints in our Lumen database that we do not have cor-
responding video data for. This, unfortunately, is inevitable
due to the sheer scale of the ecosystem.
Figure 8 plots the number of complaints and the number
of removals for each cyberlocker across our entire measure-
ment period. Only cyberlockers which received requests to
remove links gathered during our monthly crawls are in-
cluded in the figure. Within the figure, if all videos com-
plained about were removed, then the number of removals
and the number of complaints would be equal. The X-
axis is ordered by the fraction of complaints acted upon. A
clear ranking can be seen with some cyberlockers remov-
ing nearly all videos complained about11 (e.g. estream.to),
whereas others (e.g. vidzi.tv) ignore nearly all complaints.
We can compare this “obedience” rank against the others
previously discussed. We find little correlation between this
and the Alexa rank (Spearman Rank -0.015), but a stronger
correlation with the number of links on the site (-0.81). This
might exists because larger sites find it more difficult to ig-
nore legal pursuit.
11Note we cannot conclude that the removal was directly caused
by the takedown notice. We can only assume this is likely.
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Figure 9: Time-series of removals. A reported link is avail-
able if at the month of crawl we can access the video.
To expand on this we can also explore the removals over
time. Due to space constraints we select 6 cyberlockers that
have a mixture of behaviours. For these we plot the num-
ber of videos reported and deleted over time in Figure 9.
We observe a variety of behaviours. For example, websites
such as openload.co, estream.to and streamin.to react posi-
tively to copyright reports: over 75% of videos are deleted
within 1 month of complaints being registered on Lumen.
The same cannot be said of vidzi.tv and thevideo.me, where
<30% of videos are deleted within 1 month. We observe that
the videos that are not deleted from openload.co, estream.to,
vidzi.tv are all hosted in Romania on M247 (the videos that
are deleted are in other ASes). That said, it would be un-
wise to draw conclusions here, as Romania hosts both the
cyberlocker that ignores the most complaints and the cyber-
locker that acts upon most complaints. Overall, the country
hosting content that least frequently respects complaints is
the Netherlands, where only 6% of requests are acted upon.
Hence, the diversity seen within individual countries sug-
gests that the decision to act upon a complaint is largely
driven by the individual cyberlockers.
7 Conclusion & Future Work
In this paper, we have offered a first study of the emerging
streaming cyberlocker ecosystem. We began by exploring
the streaming links shared on indexing sites (§4). We discov-
ered an environment actively involved in copyright infringe-
ment with an aggressive injection of recent releases. We pro-
ceeded to examine the individual characteristics and poten-
tial relationships between these websites (§5). This identi-
fied a number of communities based on shared domains,
shared hosting facilities and high levels of HTML similar-
ity. In some cases we found that this was individual oper-
ators running multiple cyberlocker instance or simply redi-
recting into the same (or mirrored) websites. This may be
done for many reasons, but we believe it is most likely to
increase resilience in the face of legal action (§6). Indeed, a
common observation is the vulnerability of the cyberlockers.
For instance, we find that over half of all content observed is
hosted within just two ASes.
This is just the first step in our exploration of the cy-
berlocker ecosystem. There are a number of future lines of
work we will explore. We emphasise that our data has only
inspected a slice of the streaming cyberlocker ecosystem.
There are many other indexing sites, as well as portals that
we have not investigated yet. This is evidenced by the num-
ber of complaints on Lumen that we did not have the cor-
responding video data for. Hence, our major line of future
work is expanding our datasets to generalise findings across
a broader swathe of the ecosystem. We also wish to further
investigate the relationships between cyberlockers. This will
involve building more graph-based models, underpinned by
alternative data such as feature extraction from HTML. We
further plan to investigate longitudinal trends. For exam-
ple, we believe websites may periodically “rebrand” after
they have previously been taken down — studying this as
an evolving series of graphs will help identify this. We also
wish to better understand the evasion tactics used by these
sites, particularly in the face of changing strategies used by
copyright enforcers. This will, of course, involve deep div-
ing into the way that enforcers select websites to complain
about.
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